42 passages · ~90 min read
Tap any verse to open it — original, meaning & audio.
Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of construction, and on account of activity.
The Sûtras have so far set forth the doctrine that the highest Brahman is the cause of the origination and so on of t…
If it be said—like milk or water; there also (intelligence guides).
What has been said—the Sânkhya rejoins—as to the impossibility of the Pradhâna not guided by an intelligent principle…
And because from the independence (of the Pradhâna) there would follow the non-existence of what is different (from creation, i.e. of the pralaya condition).
That the Pradhâna which is not guided by an intelligent principle is not the universal cause is proved also by the fa…
Nor like grass and so on; because (milk) does not exist elsewhere.
This argumentation does not hold good; for as grass and the like do not transform themselves without the guidance of …
And if you say—as the man and the stone; thus also.
Here the following view might be urged. Although the soul consists of mere intelligence and is inactive, while the Pr…
And on account of the impossibility of the relation of principal (and subordinate) matter.
You Sânkhyas maintain that the origination of the world results from a certain relation between principal and subordi…
And if another inference be made (the result remains unchanged), on account of (the Pradhâna) being destitute of the power of a knowing subject.
Even if the Pradhâna were inferred by some reasoning different from the arguments so far refuted by us, our objection…
And even if it be admitted; on account of the absence of a purpose.
Even if it were admitted that the Pradhâna is established by Inference, the Sânkhya theory could not be accepted for …
And (it is) objectionable on account of the contradictions.
The Sânkhya-system, moreover, labours from many internal contradictions.— The Sânkhyas hold that while Prakriti is fo…
Or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic.
We have shown that the theory of the Pradhâna being the universal cause is untenable, since it rests on fallacious ar…
On both assumptions also there is no motion, and thence non-being (of the origination of the world).
The atomic theory teaches that the world is produced by the successive formation of compounds, binary, ternary, and s…
And because owing to the acknowledgment of samavâya, there results a _regressus in infinitum_ from equality.
The Vaiseshika doctrine is further untenable on account of the acknowledgment of samavâya.—Why so?—Because the samavâ…
And because (the world also) would thus be eternal.
The samavâya is a relation, and if that relation is eternal that to which the relation belongs must also be eternal, …
And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse (takes place); as it is observed.
From the view that the atoms of four kinds—viz. of earth or water or fire or air—possess colour, taste, smell, and to…
And as there are objections in both cases.
A difficulty arises not only on the view of the atoms having colour and other sensible qualities, but also on the vie…
And as it is not accepted, it is altogether disregarded.
Kapila's doctrine, although to be rejected on account of it's being in conflict with Scripture and sound reasoning, y…
Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non- establishment of that.
We so far have refuted the Vaiseshikas, who hold the doctrine of atoms constituting the general cause. Now the follow…
If it be said that (this) is to be explained through successive causality; we say 'no,' on account of their not being the causes of aggregation.
'If it be said that through the successive causality of Nescience and so on, the formation of aggregates and other ma…
And on account of the cessation of the preceding one on the origination of the subsequent one.
For the following reason also the origination of the world cannot be accounted for on the view of the momentariness o…
There not being (a cause), there results contradiction of the admitted principle; otherwise simultaneousness.
If it be said that the effect may originate even when a cause does not exist, then—as we have pointed out before—anyt…
There is non-establishment of pratisankhyâ and apratisankhyâ destruction, on account of non-interruption.
So far the hypothesis of origination from that which is not has been refuted. The present Sûtra now goes on to declar…
And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.
It has been shown that neither origination from nothing, as held by the advocates of general momentariness, is possib…
And in the case of space also, on account of there being no difference.
In order to prove the permanency of external and internal things, we have disproved the view that the two forms of de…
And on account of recognition.
We return to the proof of the, previously mooted, permanence of things. The 'anusmriti' of the Sûtra means cognition …
Not from non-entity, this not being observed.
So far we have set forth the arguments refuting the views of the Vaibhâshikas as well as the Sautrântikas—both which …
And thus there would be accomplishment on the part of non-active people also.
Thus, i.e. on the theory of universal momentariness, origination from the non-existent, causeless cognition, and so o…
Not non-existence, on account of consciousness.
Here now come forward the Yogâkâras, who hold that cognitions (ideas) only are real. There is no reasonable ground, t…
And on account of difference of nature (they are) not like dreams.
Owing to the different nature of dream-cognitions, it cannot be said that, like them, the cognitions of the waking st…
The existence (is) not, on account of the absence of perception.
The existence of mere cognitions devoid of corresponding things is not possible, because such are nowhere perceived. …
And on account of its being unproved in every way.
Here now come forward the Mâdhyamikas who teach that there is nothing but a universal Void. This theory of a universa…
Not so, on account of the impossibility in one.
The Bauddhas have been refuted. As now the Jainas also hold the view of the world originating from atoms and similar …
And likewise non-entireness of the Self.
On your view there would likewise follow non-entireness of the Self. For your opinion is that souls abide in numberle…
Nor also is there non-contradiction from paryâya; on account of change, and so on.
Nor is the difficulty to be evaded by the assumption of the soul assuming a different condition through contraction o…
And on account of the endurance of the final (size), and the (resulting) permanency of both; there is no difference.
The final size of the soul, i.e. the size it has in the state of Release, is enduring since the soul does not subsequ…
(The system) of the Lord (must be disregarded), on account of inappropriateness.
So far it has been shown that the doctrines of Kapila, Kanâda, Sugata, and the Arhat must be disregarded by men desir…
And on account of the impossibility of rulership.
Those who stand outside the Veda arrive through inference at the conclusion that the Lord is a mere operative cause. …
If you say, as in the case of the organs; we deny this, on account of enjoyment and so on.
It may possibly be said that, in the same way as the enjoying (individual) soul, although in itself without a body, i…
Finiteness or absence of omniscience.
'Or' here has the sense of 'and.' If the Lord is under the influence of the adrishta, it follows that, like the indiv…
On account of the impossibility of origination.
The Sûtras now proceed to refute a further doubt, viz. that the Pañkarâtra tantra—which sets forth the means of attai…
And there is not (origination) of the instrument from the agent.
'The internal organ called Pradyumna originates from Sankarshana,' i. e. the internal organ originates from the indiv…
Or, if they are of the nature of that which is knowledge and so on, there is no contradiction to that (i.e. the Bhâgavata doctrine).
The 'or' sets aside the view previously maintained. By 'that which is knowledge and so on' we have to understand the …
And on account of contradiction.
The origination of the jîva is, moreover, distinctly controverted in the books of the Bhâgavatas also. Thus in the Pa…